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LAND DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS IN NEPAL’S TERAI 
 
Danielle Stein (Justice and Security Research Programme, LSE) 
Bert Suykens (Conflict Research Group, University of Ghent) 
 
Introduction   
 
Land has long been among the most politically contentious issues in Nepal. This stems from 
historical patterns of land tenure which, by concentrating land ownership the wealthy and 
those close to the monarchy, were the primary channels through which authority was 
established and expressed.1 Though these patterns have evolved over time, access to land 
remains a key determinant of both social and economic status for rural Nepalis.2  
 
An examination of land relations in Nepal is a useful lens through which to explore complex 
patterns of local governance and authority.3 Indeed, since the 1960s land reform has been an 
important area of contestation between political parties. From 1996 and 2006, these issues 
were also central Nepal’s civil conflict, as Maoists targeted large landowners as a symbol 
Nepal’s exclusionary, patronage-based state. Now in the post-conflict period, land reform 
remains contentious, attracting attention from politicians, academics, NGOs and advocacy 
organizations.4   
  
The economic and political importance of land in Nepal also makes it a key consideration for 
justice and conflict resolution. In this realm, ‘access to justice’ programming has become a 
cornerstone of many international development initiatives in Nepal, many of which include a 
community mediation component. Though community mediation models differ by 
implementing organization, these programs broadly aim to increase access to justice with 
locally accessible, free dispute resolution services. Though the Nepal’s Local Self 
Government Act (1999) legally permits mediation to resolve civil disputes, land-related cases 
are often cited as the most common subject of dispute brought to community mediation. 
Despite this, little research has documented the specific land disputes occurring in villages 
across Nepal and how people attempt to resolve them. 
 
The Asia Foundation (TAF) has been implementing community mediation since 2003 and 
now has mediation programs in 104 Village Development Committees (VDCs)5 and ten 
municipalities across Nepal. In TAF’s Fall 2012 project reporting, 26% of cases brought to 
mediation were officially classified as land disputes. However, this figure may more 
realistically reach 45%, when combined with inheritance and irrigation disputes which tend 
                                                 
1
 Sikor and Lund (2009); Regmi (1968) 
2
 Upreti, B. (2004). “Resource Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Nepal.” Mountain Research and 
Development, 24(1): 60-66. Adhikari C, Chatfield P. 2008. The Role of Land Reform in Reducing Poverty 
across Nepal. Paper presented at Third Annual Himalayan Policy Research Conference, Nepal Study Centre in 
Madison, 16 October. 
3
 Forbes, A. (1999). “Mapping Power: Disrupting Claims to Kipat Land in northeastern Nepal.” American 
Ethnologist 26(1): 114-138.  
4
 For example, see Adhikari (2008) for ActionAid’s research and advocacy on land reform. 
5
 Each of Nepal’s 75 districts are divided into VDCs, or sub-district level administrative areas. VDCs are futher 
divided into nine wards, which are the smallest unit of official administrative division in Nepal.  
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to concern land.6  Closer examination of trends and issues related to land disputes will be 
essential as TAF and other organizations expand community mediation and seek to learn 
about the justice needs of many in Nepal. This report will support this aim first highlighting 
the most common types of land disputes brought to mediation and relaying local perspectives 
on their causes and consequences. Following this, this report outlines complex village-level 
justice landscape available to disputing parties. Boxed case descriptions illustrate the 
dynamics of many land disputes and the difficulties many individuals have in settling them. 
The report then concludes with reflections on mediation’s role in resolving land disputes 
along with practical recommendations for improving this aspect of the program.  
  
Methodology 
 
Primary research for this report was conducted in nine VDCs across Dhanusha, Sarlahi and 
Nawalparasi districts in the Terai. These districts were selected on the basis of TAF 2012 
reporting, which found them to have the most land disputes brought to community mediation. 
In each district, mediation coordinators were asked to provide the names of the five VDCs 
with the most land disputes. From these two VDCs per district with TAF-supported 
mediation programmes were selected, with one being more developed and one comparatively 
less developed.7  An additional VDC in each district was selected that did not have a donor-
supported mediation program. These untreated VDCs were randomly selected from the range 
of VDCs that fell within the radius of the furthest treated VDC from district municipality. 
These untreated locations provide a point of comparison with treated sites and are intended to 
provide some insight into broader disputes trends rather than to assess the impact of 
mediation specifically.  
    
This study is based on discussions with 382 respondents. Respondents were found based on a 
combination of purposeful, random and snowball sampling, and included members of local 
and district implementing staff, mediators, disputants and VDC secretaries. Additionally, 
social workers and individuals involved in local politics were targeted using a snowball 
strategy. This study also benefits from data collected during previous research in the same 
districts from August to November 2012.8 This data provided basic information about 
community mediation, overall social and dispute profiles of different areas and further aided 
in site selection.  
 
This study has a few limitations. First, the nine focus VDCs in this study were selected to 
represent varying levels of exposure to mediation as well as differing circumstances facing 
communities in the Terai. Though this approach allowed the research team to deeply explore 
each VDC, this relatively small number of sites may limit the extent to which the findings of 
this study can be generalized across the Terai. Similarly, though many similarities exist 
between the Hills and the Terai, land holding patterns, population movements and political 
                                                 
6
 TAF Quarterly Project Reporting. When combined with irrigation, road and crop-related disputes, this 
proportion reaches 33 per cent. If half of the reported transaction cases were also related to land, this total would 
equal 40 per cent. Inheritance disputes are also commonly about land, but classified as family disputes. If one 
third of inheritance cases are counted as land disputes, this proportion may equal 45 percent.  
7
 This determination was made by local partner staff. More ‘developed’ areas were often located directly on the 
main highway, had more market links and better services. They often consisted of an ‘urbanized’ centre on the 
highway with surrounding wards. Less ‘developed’ sites often were off the main highway with few services and 
little market or other economic activity. Even if located on a highway, the ‘urbanized’ centre was absent. 
8
 See Stein (2013) 
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activity also vary greatly between these areas, limiting the extent to which the findings of this 
study should be generalized to the Hill regions. Additionally, it is particularly difficult to 
know if this study is an accurate representation of violent land disputes. Though violence was 
not a particular research focus, it was nevertheless a recurring theme in many interviews.  
Most respondents did note that land disputes sometimes became violent.  However, all were 
generally hesitant to further detail these and other security-related issues. More long-term 
ethnographic field research could help to overcome these silences. 
  
Justice Needs: Typology of Land Disputes  
 
This section highlights some land disputes most common in the Terai. Across research sites, 
land was repeatedly described as a highly contentious topic, with a number of respondents 
noting the Nepali adage, ‘where there is L (land), there is C (conflict).’ In addition to 
community mediation services, land disputes are also commonly brought to local leaders, 
police and courts. As such, beginning from the dispute as opposed to the resolution 
mechanism will shed light on disputes that are not brought to mediation or reflected in 
mediation reporting. This section provides explanations of these various types of disputes, 
along with boxes detailing a specific example case for each type of dispute. 
 
Boundary Disputes 
 
Disputes related to boundaries or aalis separating fields were common in all research areas. 
Often, these disputes occur when an individual mistakenly plows onto a neighbors land by 
hand, card or tractor. Though this is often in advertent, discussions often emerge as to the 
motives behind this action. Locations with crops planted close together may specifically 
precipitate this type of dispute as sugar cane, as it is difficult to know where one field starts 
and another ends.  
 
Respondents also noted a number of boundary disputes occurring when individuals attempt to 
enlarge their own plots. This is generally a slow process, with individuals slowly plowing the 
edge of their property or incrementally planting at the edge of their neighbors land. In many 
places, nails are placed in the ground to identify property boundaries but respondents note 
that it is common for one neighbor to move the nail boundary at night so as to enlarge their 
own property. Another common strategy (and source of dispute) involves planting fruit-
bearing trees on the boundary, from which basis the farmer then claims the land underneath 
the canopy under the tree. 9 
 
Box 3.110 
Amit’s dispute started three months ago. There used to be a nail that identified the 
boundary between his land and the land of his neighbor, but this disappeared, After the 
nail disappeared, the neighbors started to trespass on Amit’s land. Although Amit 
confronted the neighbors to resolve this issue, the neighbors had four sons and thus 
wanted instead to resolve the dispute with a physical fight. Amit preferred to find four 
                                                 
9
 Research interaction #226 – in order to maintain anonymity of respondents, interviews and focus groups have 
been grouped and assigned a random identification number for the purposes of this publication. All numbers in 
subsequent footnotes further reference such research interactions.  
10
 154 
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respected people to help to talk it out. His uncle, who was a Nepali Congress politician 
and a mediator told him about community mediation. Amit put a notice of his dispute 
with the mediation committee and chose his uncle as his mediator. The neighbors also 
selected their own mediators, in addition to the local elders that were present. Amit’s 
neighbors were reluctant to settle at first, but they agreed that the elders who knew the 
boundary would come and identify it. This was done and now Amit’s case is resolved.  
 
 
Many respondents also note that encroachment is a common form of dispute.  This often 
occurs when one disputant builds a structure very near to or on the boundary line separating 
his property from his neighbor’s. Often this structure may damage the neighbor’s property or 
reduce its value and result in significant damage that is beyond the capacity of most people to 
repay. 
 
Box 3.211 
Muhammad donated his land to a social organization so they could construct a religious 
building. One of the neighbors has built a house over the boundary line, partly on the 
land Muhammad donated. His neighbor is a badmash (scoundrel) and powerful at the 
moment. He has connections to politically powerful people, so it might get violent. The 
appropriate time will come and he can reclaim the land. He will first go through the 
local group of elders to try to get justice. If that doesn’t work he will try to go through 
mediation and has already contacted the mediation coordinator about this. But, as there 
is a lot of political factionalism at the moment, the coordinator has advised him to wait 
to resolve the dispute. So he is still waiting for the appropriate time to challenge his 
neighbor. 
 
Another type of boundary dispute is related to land measurement. Land is generally measured 
by professional amins (surveyors). This process can be contentious, as it can invalidate 
historically agreed upon boundaries or measurements made using a different measurement 
system such as ‘hands’ or using rope.12 Though amins are respected people with a 
tremendous amount of authority, some respondents note that some private amins accept 
bribes in exchange for giving measurements that favor one disputing party over another.13 
This practice, many respondents note, means that disputes tend to intensify when private 
amins are involved.14 Despite these problems, respondents noted that many people prefer 
private amins, as they are significantly faster and cheaper than amins employed by the 
government.15  
 
Ownership Disputes  
 
Respondents note that disputes are also often related to ownership of entire plots of land, 
rather than to specific boundaries. The frequency of such disputes varies greatly by location: 
either there are very few such disputes in a given area, or the ownership of a high proportion 
of plots is hotly contested. This observation may be related to the historical patterns of how, 
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when, and by whom, the land was settled and registered, as well as the education levels of its 
settlers.  
 
Respondents noted that many ownership disputes stem from the failure to register land and 
land transactions. This observation is consistent with previous studies that find ‘up to half of 
Nepal’s landholders have no legal entitlement to their land.’16 In such cases, families have 
often been living on, or plowing, a plot for many years without having registration papers 
proving their ownership, or without checking the accuracy of the papers on file. Many of 
these individuals attribute this to a lack of knowledge of land registration and of the 
seemingly complicated process. This is understandable as historically land ownership was 
agreed orally between neighbors. This scenario may also occur when an individual has 
recently bought a plot of land but either fails to register it or receives false registration papers. 
Though neighbors will be able to confirm that a family has been plowing a given plot, this is 
often not enough proof to resolve such issues, which often lead to an intractable dispute. 
 
Box 3.317 
Mohar’s family has always used their land for farming, and has passed it down from 
father to son since his grandfather acquired it.  Recently, someone bought the 
neighboring plot, but soon after the purchase also tried to claim that he owned part of 
Mohar’s land as well. The buyer claims that the person he bought his land from also 
sold him part of Mohar’s land, but Mohar never agreed, but does not have any 
paperwork showing the boundaries of his land to use in his defense. Mohar came to the 
VDC to settle the dispute. After mediation, Mohar sold 5 khatta of his land to his new 
neighbor. 
 
These scenarios create a number of opportunities for those with unregistered land to be 
exploited by those with better education or knowledge of the law. Some respondents note that 
landlords and powerful individuals in the community use disputes as a way to evict poor 
families.18 In such cases, a landlord may preemptively register another family’s land in their 
own name and then pick a fight. Once the dispute starts, the landlords will already legally 
own the family’s property and force the family to vacate it. In other cases, the land may be 
registered but the property owners may lack the resources, connections, or knowledge to fight 
the case against a landlord. As such, they may ultimately be forced to give up a portion of 
their property to their aggressors.   
 
Box 3.419 
Bonshi had land in ward nine. When the government land survey was conducted, a 
landlord from that ward was able to register his son as the owner of that land instead of 
Bonshi. He has been trying to solve this case for the last one and a half years and has 
spent about 1.5 lakh (approx. US$1,510) in travel, fees and bribes. First he registered 
the case with the police. But as the landlord’s son to whom the land had been registered 
was abroad, Bonshi had to wait until he returned. The son did not want to fight over the 
land but his father put pressure on him.  Eventually the police decided the land should 
be given to Bonshi, but the landlord warned Bonshi they would come after him if he 
                                                 
16
 Wily, L.A. (2008). Land Reform in Nepal: Where is it Coming From and Where is it Going?’ The Findings of 
A Scoping Study, DFID Nepal. Available at http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication 
/797/nepal_law_book.pdf, p. 72 
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ever tried to take it back. Now Bonshi decided to commit to fighting his case: he visited 
the land revenue office and land registration office first and then filed his case in 
community mediation. However, the mediators told him that nothing could be done now 
that his land was registered to someone else. He suspects that this is because the 
mediation committee knows how powerful the landlord is in the community and the 
threats he’d made to Bonshi – fearing they may face the same threats in the future. 
 
Furthermore, some respondents note that when the jungle was cleared and land first settled 
many decades ago, the powerful people in the community secured papers for all plots in the 
village. Despite owning the land, many landlords allowed others to plow the plots, leading 
many to believe that the land was theirs.20 In some cases, these landlords sold the plots but 
failed to transfer the ownership to the buyer, creating a protracted dispute.  At other times, 
land owners will sell their plots without informing the families occupying them. Though 
these actions are illegal, in many cases land still has dual owners: one who is plowing it and 
one who owns it legally.21   
 
Box 3.522  
Kiran bought land from Mangal in the late 1970s. The transaction was conducted 
verbally and no legal papers were made. Kiran decided to sell this land to Abhik in 
2007, and asked Mangal to prepare paperwork. Mangal agreed and the deal was made, 
but Mangal delayed preparing the paperwork. Abhik agreed to pay 2/5 of the price of 
the land up front and to pay the rest once the legal papers were finally delivered. Five 
years later, Abhik came to Kiran to demand the paperwork, after which Kiran went 
again to Mangal to ask to him to prepare the papers. However, by this time Mangal’s 
son had also claimed ownership over the land. Mangal asked Kiran to settle this matter 
with his son, but his son refused, arguing that Kiran forced Mangal to sell his land. They 
tried to settle the issue by proposing that Mangal pay Abhik the same fee that he paid to 
Kiran when he bought the land, leaving Mangal’s family to control the land. However, 
Abhik refused this deal as the value of the land had risen significantly since he first sold 
the land. Kiran wanted to settle the dispute, but he knew he could not go to court as 
Mangal had the legal papers and would win.  
 
At this point, Abhik decided to go to mediation. There, he agreed with Mangal that he 
would  get the land but would have to pay double the amount that Abhik paid to Kiran.  
Everybody seemed to agree on the deal, notwithstanding the relatively low price at 
which Mangal would get the control over the land back. Unfortunately, at the time of 
the interview no money had been transferred despite the agreement made in mediation.  
 
Inheritance disputes 
 
Inheritance disputes, particularly between brothers, are almost invariably about land and 
division of existing property. Such disputes are often complicated by the presence of a house 
or valuable trees or crops on the land, as well as differing claims between siblings as to who 
gave their deceased parents the most care.23 Other factors further complicate inheritance 
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cases, including oral agreements over boundaries, or land ownership made by the deceased’s 
relatives or other parties.  
 
 
Box 3.6 
Sukhdev’s uncle bought 1 bigha24, 11 katha25 of land for NR 1600 (US$16) many years 
ago. Later Sukhdev’s father bought the land from his brother for NR 1800 (US$18). At 
that time no legal papers were made. After some years his uncle migrated to Udaypur (a 
hill district) along with his family. Now both Sukhdev’s father and uncle have died. 
Sukhdev wants to sell the land, so he requested his nephew (the son of his uncle) to 
come and make the transaction legal. However despite Sukdev’s many pleas and offers 
to pay the transit and lodging costs, his nephew still refuses to come. Sukhdev feels he 
cannot do anything as he does not have papers for the transaction. He decides he must 
wait for his nephew to have a change of heart and must remain on the land until then.  
 
Mohi Lands 
 
Like inheritance disputes, disputes related to mohis or tenant farmers, arise due to lack of 
documentation and poor understanding of legal entitlements. These arrangements can be 
traced back to a period where land was given to the nobility and members of the civil and 
military service, and was then cultivated by peasant tenants known as mohis.26 Since that 
time, these tenants have been subjugated to their landlords, with mohi-status passed down 
from generation to generation. Most mohis interviewed for this study continue to fully 
depend on their land for subsistence.  
 
The laws governing mohi arrangements were not well understood by the mohis interviewed 
for this study. After plowing their lands for years, many mohis believed they were entitled to 
own a certain proportion of the land. At minimum, mohis who have plowed for at least one 
season are only entitled to half its crop yields.27 Confusion regarding mohi land ownership 
and crop division has created many land disputes, with multiple mohis often making claims 
against the same landlord for the parcel of land. In these cases, mohis often have difficulty 
proving their tenancy due to a lack of documentation and thus are not able to claim their 
share of crops.  However, even when tenants are able to demonstrate their right to the land, 
respondents note that landlords are often unwilling to part with their land, and use their 
considerable resources to sway the decisions of courts against their tenants.28  
 
Box 3.7 
Kumar is a mohi and he plows two bigha of his landlord’s land. As his landlord is 
preparing to sell the land, Kumar is having a dispute with his landlord about how to 
divide the money from the sale of the land. The landlord claims that he has transferred 
ownership of the land to the village temple and thus does not owe Kumar anything. 
Kumar is not sure if this is true, but he continues to plow the land and to give a share of 
the production to the owner. He claims that all the local people support his case, but as 
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 Bigha is a unit used to measure land area. One bigha is equivalent to 6,772 m2.  
25
 Katha is a unit used to measure land area. One katha is equivalent to 338 m2. 
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 Regmi (1971). These were primarily on Jagir and Birta lands.  
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 Nepal Land Act. Amendment V. Nepal Law Commission; correspondence with The Asia Foundation staff  
28
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the owner lives in a neighboring village, this does not impress him. He has tried to 
resolve the case through discussions with the village elders, but they refuse to get 
involved. At this point, Kumar is thinking of going to the district court to try to resolve 
the dispute. 
 
 
Public lands  
 
Many disputes also occur as a result of the complicated status of public land, land used for 
charitable purposes (guthi land) and land used for development activities (sarkari land).29  
Guthi lands often house temples or other holy sites, and are highly concentrated in areas like 
Janakpur in Dhanusha district, which was one site of this study. Though it is meant to be in 
the public domain, the use of such land is often not monitored, leaving it open to ‘squatters’ 
to cultivate. These ‘squatters’ do not formally own a particular plot and thus often fight over 
the right to cultivate the undemarcated land. These lands are also administered by public 
officials – as such, brokers are reportedly able to buy these lands for the price of a bribe, then  
sell them at an even higher profit.30 Respondents noted that disputes regarding public and 
guthi land are particularly complex as they involve multiple disputants and are often 
exploited by political parties with an interest in securing these symbolic properties.  
 
Additional land-related disputes 
 
In addition, irrigation disputes were also prominent in research areas. This is due primarily 
to the fact that a number of canals have multiple entry and exit points for water. This allows 
for many opportunities for residents to divert water, which may cause a dispute.31  
 
Adhiya arrangements were also commonly identified as a cause of disputes. Adhiya is a form 
of sharecropping,32 which requires a tenant to share a portion of the crop, seeds, fertilizers 
and other raw inputs with the landlord. Though it is customary for the landlord to share fifty 
per cent of the crop with the tenant, the exact proportions depend on the specific agreement 
between the two parties.33 Adhiya arrangements vary across the Terai, though for this study 
they were more commonly reported in the Central than in the Eastern Terai. In Nawalparasi, 
a number of respondents highlighted adhiya disputes concerning the amount of crops they 
were required to give to their landlord. Many respondents were concerned that their landlords 
may be asking them to give a larger proportion of their crop than was required, though felt 
that they had no way to verify this or hold their landlords to account.  
 
                                                 
29
 Acharaya (2008). Dhanusha district, one location of this research, is known to have a particularly high 
number of guthi lands,  
30
 In May 2013 the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority issued a statement to government 
officials imploring them to observe a code of conduct when dealing with public land, targeting specifically 
dealings with brokers and members of the ‘land mafia.’  See (2013) “Land Mafia in CIAA Chief’s Crosshairs.” 
The Himalaya Times [Kathmandu] 10 May, available at http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/ful 
lNews.php?headline=Land+mafia+in+CIAA+chief's+crosshairs+&NewsID=375973.  
31
 #84, #85, #93 
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 Dhakal (2011) 
33
 Correspondence with the Asia Foundation Nepal, July 2013 
9 
 
It should be noted that respondents rarely mentioned disputes related to community forests or 
users groups. This is noteworthy since this has been a significant area of scholarly inquiry in 
Nepal over the past decades. In the Terai, many of the forests have been cleared, eliminating 
this potential source of disputes from many communities. In others, community forest user 
groups often have their own internal mechanisms for resolving disputes that may contain or 
reduce these disputes over time. This is consistent with mediation reporting, which finds only 
two disputes related to community forests were brought to mediation in the Fall 2012 
reporting period.  
 
Structural Causes of Disputes  
  
The above discussion has highlighted many of the most common land disputes identified in 
interviews. Based on this information, this section recounts the numerous and often inter-
related factors that respondents identified as underlying causes of these land disputes. 
Broadly, respondents attributed the large number of land disputes in research areas to four 
primary factors: changes in population, increasing land prices, changes in education level and 
the work of dalals (brokers).   
 
Population Changes 
 
The population of the Terai has grown steadily in the last decades. This growth was jump-
started by the eradication of malaria in the Terai in the 1950s and by policies designed to 
incentivise migration from Nepal’s hills. Many respondents noted that this continuous 
population growth has led to, and exacerbated, many disputes, as people are living closer and 
closer together and the average plot size is shrinking. 
 
These dynamics combined with internal migration between different communities in the 
Terai and the large number of men going abroad for work seems to have reduced the depth of 
local institutional memory. In the past, it was common for individuals to spend their entire 
lives in one village.  Certain people could therefore be counted on to know the intricacies of 
oral agreements and were often called upon to determine property boundaries.  The absence 
of this local knowledge is often the cause of disputes since fewer neighbors know who owns 
what land and the conditions under which they acquired it. Residents note that a lack of 
knowledge of land holding patterns and practices causes disputes to erupt and often makes 
these disputes harder to resolve.  
 
Finally, migration to and within the Terai has brought new ethnic, religious and caste groups 
to communities in this area. Madhesi communities alone are often very diverse, but this 
diversity has been compounded by the addition of ethnic groups from Nepal’s hill regions. 
Though some mixed communities covered in this research have been living harmoniously, 
others are plagued by inter-ethnic tension, which often underlies many civil and criminal 
disputes. Respondents noted that many disputes driven by these tensions manifest themselves 
in land disputes over seemingly minor boundary, encroachment or ownership issues.  
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Land Prices 
  
Population growth has also contributed to rising land prices, which many respondents cite as 
the cause of many land disputes. Though data does not exist to show the exact growth in 
prices, respondents universally agreed that land prices are now significantly higher than even 
five years prior, often citing a five-fold price increase over this period.34  Prices of plots in 
close proximity to district headquarters, towns and the highway have increased the most, 
though the value of plots close to the Nepal-India border also rose dramatically. These 
findings are a departure from previous studies, which characterize Nepal’s property market as 
underdeveloped and property as transferred largely through inheritance.35  
  
Beyond the growing Terai population, respondents attributed the growth of the Terai property 
market to a number of factors. For example, increasing interest from investors in Kathmandu 
and other cities has increased demand for land in the Terai and raised its market price 
significantly. As land in the Terai is cheaper than an equivalent plot across the border in 
India, many noted that Indian families buy property in the Terai and are willing to pay at, or 
above, market rates.36 In addition, as only Nepali citizens are permitted to buy property, the 
wave of Terai residents who received citizenship after the 2006 People’s Movement brought 
many new buyers into the property market.37 Finally, remittances sent from those working 
abroad have significantly improved the economic condition of many families in the Terai. 
Though these remittances themselves may go on basic expenditure, respondents argue that 
this financial injection into many communities has a net effect of increasing demand for land 
as well as many families’ willingness to pay for it.38   
 
In addition to the expansion of the property market, economic development taking place 
across the Terai has also made land in this area more attractive. Specifically, the expansion of 
paved roads and highways in the Terai has likely been the most significant factor in 
increasing land values in his area. These expanded roads support overall development in the 
area, which has made even remote villages attractive to property speculators from 
Kathmandu. Operating as both individuals and companies, these speculators reportedly buy 
large plots of land, then divide them and resell smaller plots at a higher profit margin. This 
has increased the price of land, even in less agriculturally productive areas.  
 
Respondents noted that rising land values seem to have reshaped how many individuals think 
about land and land ownership in the Terai. Historically, land has been a primary source of 
livelihood for many but was not previously thought of as a monetary asset. For this reason, 
many farmers did not feel compelled to have their plots measured or boundaries documented 
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and registered. Now that land prices have risen dramatically, respondents described a new 
interest in knowing the exact size of their property and in securing as much land as possible. 
As one respondent noted, ‘these people have been living there for generations. They were not 
very well aware about land registration and allocation, but now that the road has gone 
through, people are starting to fight over inches and inches of land.’39 These dynamics have 
created more tensions and led to more disputes but have also made it very difficult for the 
poorest farmers to acquire land or to expand their existing holdings.  
 
Education and Awareness 
 
In addition to rising prices, respondents consistently cited a lack of education and 
‘awareness’ in their communities as a cause of many disputes. Many respondents described 
their own villages and communities as ‘backwards’ and characterized other people as easily 
swayed and unable to handle disputes rationally. This, many argue, explains why disputes 
arise in the first place as well as why they escalate, even over relatively minor issues. 
Respondents often spoke of such lack of awareness, in conjunction with high levels of 
unemployment in the Terai, which creates opportunities for disputes to begin and grow. 
 
Contradicting these observations, other respondents actually identified rising levels of 
education as a driver of land disputes. Increasing levels of education, they argued, made 
people more aware of the potential legal options for claiming property, whether they were 
entitled to it or not. Respondents noted that concurrent with the decline in local knowledge, 
the younger generation puts more emphasis on blueprints and papers than on oral agreements 
or traditions. As a result, many respondents mentioned that education had made previously 
informal land transfers open to contestation by the younger generation, resulting in land 
disputes.40 
 
Box 4.1 
Bijay is a shop-owner. About twenty years ago his parents bought a large plot of land in 
ward five and have plowed it ever since. Mangal was planning to build a house on the 
land, so he started to measure it. He checked the blueprints and they showed that their 
plot should actually be shifted to the east. He also realized that his neighbor had already 
built a house on a corner of what he now knew to be his land.  This started the dispute. 
Bijay and his neighbor came to mediation and brought two amins to measure the land. 
After they measured all the boundaries, it became clear that his neighbor had made an 
error, and he agreed to move the house. Despite reaching this agreement, Bijay is still 
waiting for his neighbor to move his house. His neighbor claims he is waiting for an 
auspicious month to start the work, so Bijay is still waiting. 
Dalals 
 
Respondents across many areas noted that the role of dalals (brokers) in disputes in their 
communities contributed to land disputes. In some places, dalals function as brokers who 
reportedly convince poor, less educated families to sell their land for less than it is worth. 
These brokers then re-sell the land for the market price and keep a portion of the profit. A 
few people admitted that these dalals were working with the support of political parties, and 
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speculated that some of the parties also took a share of this profit in exchange for backing up 
the dalals with connection and physical force if necessary. These interactions often lead to 
disputes, but as victims usually have fewer resources they are generally unable to win a case 
against well-connected dalals.  
 
Box 4.2 
Parwez has been plowing one katha of land for a long time but has not registered it. As 
he has been using the land for a long time, the people in the village office told him he 
should make sure to have it registered to himself. However, a neighbor told Parwez that 
only 5 dhurs41 of the katha were his and the rest belonged to his neighbor.  The case 
went to the district court and, after spending large sum of money, Parwez won the case. 
His neighbor appealed the case and bribed some officials to make sure that Parwez did 
not receive a notification to appear before the court. Despite this, Parwez still won the 
case in the appellate division. After this, the other party got the help of a dalal, who was 
known in the community as an alcohol drinker and a criminal. The dalal has ignited 
disputes with Parwez’s other neighbors and attempted to turn them all against him, 
resulting in Parwez’s father being beaten. These disputes are now with the mediation 
committee, but no decision has been reached because his opponent  (with the help of the 
broker) continues to try to turn the community against him. Recently, the dalal invited 
Parwez to a social event, but Parwez did not go, fearing a plot to hurt him. As of now, 
the case is at a standstill, and Parwez fears that he will not be able to get a fair outcome 
not matter where he takes the case.  
 
In other areas respondents used the term dalal to describe a person who specifically incites a 
dispute or ignites an existing dispute for monetary and political gain.42 These individuals are 
often reportedly backed by political parties and have connections at the local and district 
levels of government. Money is often paid to dalals directly in exchange for using their 
purported connections to push a case through the courts. If the dalals are able to use their 
connections to help their ‘clients’ win cases, the client is expected to support the dalal and 
the party he represents politically. Dalals also reportedly seek to elongate and complicate 
cases to the extent that disputants may give up on their case. Once disputants give up, the 
dalal will often take the land for themselves, or on behalf of their party.   
 
Though not cited specifically in research cites, these dalals are likely part of the larger ‘land 
mafia’ operating across Nepal. Cases such as those described above have previously appeared 
in both Nepali and Indian news in direct connection with land mafia groups.43 Driven by 
economic interest, these groups may also have political motivations, as they may be backed 
by political parties or be heavily involved with corrupt government officials. As such, public 
and charitable land has been particularly susceptible to appropriation by these groups.    
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Dispute settlement mechanisms  
 
There are a number of potential arenas where Nepalis may seek to resolve their disputes. 
These arrangements can be described using the concept of legal pluralism, which recognizes 
the existence of multiple legal orders within a social setting.44 These can range from formal 
legal provisions, customary and religious law, as well as local norms and customs (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2002). Moore (1973) notes that in such orders, there are multiple social 
fields, with actors and norms that generate rules for the given field, as and both influence and 
are influenced by other fields. In Nepal, these begin at the village (ward, or tole) level and 
stretch to the supreme court in Kathmandu.  
 
Levels of dispute settlement 
 
Community and Village Level  
 
Nearly all respondents noted that it is always preferable to resolve a dispute locally. By 
‘locally’ most Nepalis mean within a village, usually defined as at the ward or at the tole 
(grouping of wards) level.  
 
According to respondents, resolving disputes locally involves calling the respected members 
of the village together to hear and adjudicate the dispute – often called bhadbhaladmis or 
bhalomanavs. Such individuals often include ex-ward and ex-VDC chiefs who were elected 
in 1997 but whose terms have since expired, as well as elders in the community, social 
workers and politicians. In some locations a set group of people are always called to resolve 
disputes, whereas in other places these individuals may be handpicked by the disputant. Often 
these individuals sit with both disputants in a public area, hear both sides, and decide the case 
in front of a group of spectators. In this case, there is a clear victim and an oppressor in the 
dispute, with the oppressor sometimes required to apologise, pay a fine, repair damage done 
to the victim, or cover any outstanding medical bills.  
 
 
Village Development Committee (VDC) 
 
At the VDC level, there are two primary options for dispute resolution. The first is through 
the VDC secretary who, according to the Local Self Government Act, is charged with 
adjudicating local civil disputes. Often the VDC secretary will make a decision himself but 
may also refer it to the police or courts. Respondents also note other examples of the VDC 
Secretary inviting respected individuals in the community to aid in the dispute resolution 
process.  
 
Secondly, some VDCs also have a community mediation program, including but not limited 
to those implemented by TAF. To participate, disputants first register their dispute with the 
VDC secretary, who then refers it to community mediation committees. In VDCs with 
mediation programs, this referral often comes automatically, as long as the case is deemed 
appropriate for mediation. The disputants then select their mediators from the 27-member 
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panel of trained mediators, and, along with a third mediator selected by the VDC, have their 
dispute adjudicated in private. The reasons most often cited for using mediation are its 
location within the VDC as well as its zero cost. 
 
A third option used to be available in some VDCs when the elected VDC chairman and 
committee were still in place. At this time, a committee would be formed out of the VDC 
committee to settle disputes. 
 
Some respondents noted they would seek help in the VDC if their case was not resolved 
locally. However, many preferred to go straight to the police, who are generally seen as 
having more power and authority than the options available at the VDC.  
 
Box 5.1: Jan Adalat 
The Jan Adalat or People’s Courts were an additional dispute settlement mechanism 
that operated during Nepal’s conflict period (1996-2006). These mechanisms were 
established by the then Maoist insurgents as an alternative to formal and traditional 
justice mechanisms. In interviews, one female former Maoist leader described these 
venues as “the best way to solve cases,” though this simply reflects the views of 
someone closely associated with the operation of these courts. She explained the 
process: people who wanted to settle a dispute informed a local Maoist activist, who 
communicated the request to the local party leadership. Disputants were then brought to 
the Jan Adalat, often based in an isolated location. The disputants would state their case 
before a crowd of local people, who would then decide which party was right and show 
their support by physically standing behind that person. Whichever side had the most 
supporters behind them won the dispute.  
 
In land cases, the Jan Adalat tended to give preference to those who plowed the land 
over those with the legal paperwork. As such, people sometimes attempted to erase 
paperwork recording land ownership or put the papers in their adversary’s name. Some 
disputants also occasionally brought non-Maoist politicians to witness the proceedings, 
along with journalists to report on them. These journalists provided some security, since 
if the proceedings got violent the journalists could later report on it, or potentially deter 
the violence altogether. Things went wrong when those in charge of the court believed 
that one disputant was telling a lie, resulting in that disputant being beaten up. After the 
conflict, the Jan Adalats have ceased to exist, which our informant regretted. Despite 
this, most of her Maoist friends (including herself) once involved in the Jan Adalats 
continue to settle disputes. Unfortunately, she says, many Maoists are now easily 
swayed by the rich and no longer give justice to the poor. 
 
 
Nepal Police 
  
The police in Nepal often function as a de-facto arm of the formal justice system. Police are 
based either in each VDC or in a cluster of VDCs, making them physically accessible to most 
people living in villages. Though police are not legally permitted to resolve disputes, the 
police often help community members resolve disputes as part of their larger mandate to keep 
order and peace in the village. Many of those interviewed for this study also considered the 
police to be a legitimate place to take a non-violent dispute and noted that they would go to 
the police if they were unable to resolve their dispute locally. Others noted they would go to 
the police only if a dispute was not able to be resolved at the VDC, or with the 
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recommendation of the VDC secretary. For violent disputes, however, respondents nearly 
universally said they would prefer to go to the police first as they were the only body that 
could exert force on a violent individual.  
 
 
Courts  
 
Nepali courts begin at the district headquarters and are followed by sequentially ‘higher’ 
courts in each of Nepal’s five zones and, ultimately, at the Supreme Court in Kathmandu. 
Many respondents note that the court would be their last option for dispute resolution, as 
courts are located far away from most villages and are very expensive. Indeed, a TAF study 
found that the average district court case cost 1300 Nrs (US$15),45  with Zone and Supreme 
courts costing even more. Many respondents living outside district headquarters noted that 
for civil cases they would prefer not to resolve their dispute at all, rather than to take it to 
even a district court.46 This signifies both how expensive and how difficult it can be to 
navigate the court system, as well as the impression among many Nepali villagers that courts 
are mainly for the rich.  
  
 
Selecting Justice Mechanisms  
 
Overall, several factors tend to determine where justice seekers attempt to resolve their 
disputes. First are practical concerns: cost and location. The majority of Nepalis live in rural 
areas and thirty per cent of them reportedly earn an average of only 14 US$ per month.47 A 
visit to court therefore costs the average person both money and time away from tending their 
fields or other livelihood activities.  Thus, for many Nepalis local level justice mechanisms 
are the only ones they can afford. Given this reality, reducing the cost of justice services and 
locating them closer to communities are the primary ways that access to justice programs, 
including those for community mediation, improve the accessibility of justice.   
 
A secondary concern for some Nepalis, particularly those with more financial resources, is 
which justice outlet they believe will afford them the best outcome. This behavior is 
consistent with ‘forum shopping,’ in which justice seekers ‘shop’ for the best outcome.48  
Perceptions regarding which circumstances create the ‘best’ outcome vary, but respondents 
noted that this is often dependent on a disputant’s ability to fight a case in the formal system, 
beginning at the district level and going all the way to the Supreme Court in Kathmandu. 
Rich disputants, they note, are able to continue cases indefinitely, both by bribing decision 
makers to stall a verdict, referring it to a higher court, or by filing appeals after every 
decision. Rich disputants who can aggressively fight their cases, respondents argued, are 
much more likely to win.   
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Fears of social stigma also influence where justice seekers take their problems. Many 
respondents noted that being involved in a dispute is often considered to create perceptions 
that they are a ‘difficult person in the community.’ This is most common in the case of 
family-based disputes such as domestic violence, polygamy and divorce, but can also be true 
for less personal issues such as land and livestock. Seeking justice is similarly stigmatized, 
with attempts to utilize more formalized justice mechanisms seen as a sign of the severity of 
the dispute. For example, the least severe disputes, it is assumed, are resolved in the 
community, and the most severe ones resolved in court. In other South Asian cases, studies 
find that such stigma may prevent women from seeking to resolve domestic violence and 
other family issues either outside the home or at all.49  
 
 
Box 5.250  
Nandalar’s dispute begins with land owned by his grandfather, which he passed down to 
his sons, Nandalar’s father and uncle. Nandalar’s uncle managed to register all the land 
in his own name, despite the fact that Nandalar’s father been working his ‘share’ of this  
land for many years. His uncle has now claimed all the land as his own and wants 
Nandalar to vacate his share. This uncle also used to be the VDC chairman and is a 
relatively educated person, capable of reading well and writing. Nandalar called a 
village meeting to settle the dispute with his uncle. At the meeting it was decided that 
Nandalar should get his father’s portion of land, which the uncle agreed to. Afterwards 
Nandalar went to the registration office alone as his uncle refused to accompany him. 
There he was told both he and his uncle had to pay NR 50000 (US$ 50) to arrange the 
necessary paperwork. As his uncle was not there Nandalar paid for both parties in order 
to expedite the registration. However, his uncle still refused to give him his share of the 
land. Since his uncle is powerful, nothing can be done to force him. Following this, 
Nandalar went to mediation to try to settle this dispute. There, his uncle agreed again to 
the original terms and signed an agreement one year ago. However, his uncle still 
refuses to cooperate. Nandalar has asked the mediators multiple times to put pressure on 
his uncle, but they also refuse. Now he has taken the case to court and is awaiting a trial 
there.  
 
While many people spoke well of the different dispute settlement options, the extent to which 
disputants ‘forum shop’ is also partly the result of the non-implementation of many of the 
decisions reached in various dispute settlement arenas. As the majority of settlements reached 
in the community and in community mediation are not enforceable by law, the losing party is 
often able to renege on the terms of their agreement.  This is compounded by the fact that the 
village elders, community mediation and the police may all reach different and sometimes 
contradictory decisions regarding the same case. This provides an opening for contestation by 
the more powerful party, which makes decisions less likely to be implemented.  
 
 
Recommendations for Meeting Justice Needs  
 
Overall, this study suggests that mediation has made an important contribution to resolving 
land disputes in project locations. Though mediation was often a second choice after first 
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attempting to resolve a case among local leaders, respondents who had used mediation were 
generally satisfied with their experience. This section provides recommendations for how to 
further improve the efficacy of mediation on resolving land disputes, and provides insights 
into how mediation can improve ‘access to justice.’ 
 
Mediation’s Legal Status 
 
There are a number of legal and practical factors that prevent mediation from more fully 
serving those with land related disputes. Most consequential is mediation’s legal status, 
which does not provide recourse if a disputant fails to implement a decision reached in 
mediation, other than an additional mediation session. Many respondents also noted that 
mediation’s inability to compel disputants to attend a mediation session limited its efficacy as 
a form of dispute resolution. Disputants often want to file cases, but cannot as their co-
disputant is either unwilling to attend mediation, has fled to India, or, as is the case of many 
landlords, lives in Kathmandu. Given that for some people mediation is the only justice 
mechanism available besides community leaders and elders, its inability to compel disputants 
to attend limits its effectiveness as a way to increase access to justice.    
Mediation as part of a wider dispute settlement arena 
 
Any analysis of community mediation should understand it in the context of the many forms  
of dispute resolution available at the local level. Proponents of community mediation as a 
form of alternative dispute resolution often contrast mediation to formal dispute modes of 
dispute resolution, particularly those that are perceived to be dysfunctional or exclusionary.  
 
Though respondents did often frame the formal justice system as exclusionary, it is a mistake 
to view the formal and the local, or informal, system as separate entities. Rather, many active 
community members, particularly politicians, act as connections between different justice 
delivery mechanisms, including mediation and are often part of multiple local justice arenas. 
For example, the same elder might resolve disputes informally in the ward, serve as a 
mediator, and be a broker at the court who helps ‘push cases through’ by accepting and 
distributing bribes. Rather than focusing on the boundaries between these mechanisms, the 
close linkages between different justice delivery mechanisms should be taken into account 
when assessing justice needs, accessibility and outcomes. Adopting this view should also 
provide an opportunity for mediation proponents to think more closely about how mediation 
relates to other forms of dispute settlement.  
Mediator Training  
 
Mediators specifically identified land disputes as among the most difficult to resolve.51 They 
attributed this to a number of factors. First, disputants are particularly invested in their 
position and less likely to compromise. As one mediator noted, ‘land is about a person’s life, 
their blood and sweat. They don’t want to give it up easily.’52 Second, unlike many other 
kinds of disputes brought to mediation, the fact that at least one disputant often has some 
documentation supporting his or her land case often affords less space for the negotiation and 
compromise essential to the mediation process. This is complicated by the multi-generational 
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history of verbal agreements governing many pieces of land, particularly when those relatives 
are no longer present.53 Finally, it is very difficult for mediators, police and elders to enforce 
decisions related to land, as it is nearly impossible to remove someone from their land if they 
are not willing to leave. This combination of factors represents a particular challenge for 
mediators. More training on mediation approaches and techniques to transcend these issues of 
evidence, interest and livelihood would most likely improve mediators’ ability to effectively 
act on these issues.  
 
A few specific trends highlighted in the cases in previous sections indicate potential training 
options to help mediators transcend these difficulties. First, many of the most complicated 
land-related cases involve group-individual or group-group disputes. Mediation training has 
begun to integrate group resolution skills into its curriculum, but the prominence of these 
disputes suggests that expanding this would be beneficial.  
 
In addition, mediators also identified a number of specific land-related skills that could help 
them improve their ability to resolve land disputes. Most common was the request for 
additional training on land measurement and blueprint reading. Mediators will sometimes 
involve amins in the dispute resolution process, but this can often be expensive and time 
consuming. Giving mediators the skills to measure land accurately and read property 
blueprints would allow them to facilitate a cheaper and more efficient resolution.  Beyond 
training, some mediators mentioned the need for clearer guidelines in mediation protocol for 
resolving land disputes. The question of if, and when, it is appropriate for a mediator to 
involve an amin, to measure the plot themselves, and when to visit the plot of land in 
question were among these most prominent requests. As with the queries noted above, many 
of these questions relate to the difficulty of balancing interests, needs and evidence within the 
mediation process.  
 
Public Awareness  
 
Improving public awareness of many land-related practices may also be useful in preventing 
future land disputes. Many respondents noted that land issues, particularly those related to 
ownership, grew out of a lack of understanding of the legal process related to buying, selling 
and registering property.  The poor and less educated in particular often do not know the 
importance of registering their land, or if they do, are not able to complete the process 
themselves due to high fees, illiteracy, or distance from the district headquarters. These 
factors often lead to disputes themselves, or further complicate existing ones.  
 
A lack of clarity on the part of the general population regarding mohi and adhiya 
arrangements has also led to many disputes. This is related to the specific rights afforded to 
individuals working under these arrangements, regarding the necessary time period of 
tenancy, the nature of tenancy and the proportion of crops due to landlords. Though this 
generally requires at least one year of tenancy before crops are shared and specific 
agreements made related to ownership, these  arrangements tend to vary widely across the 
country. Many respondents also noted that they did not fully understand how to claim these 
rights and benefits, particularly if they are entitled to land through a mohi arrangement. Given 
this broader lack of understanding, public awareness campaigns may be useful in preventing 
land disputes and the abuse of land and property rights.  
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Lastly, in many research locations there seemed to be a lack of understanding about the 
community mediation program and process. In some areas, people were often unaware of the 
existence of community mediation, particularly in wards far from the VDC office. As such, 
educating community members regarding the existence and services offered by mediation 
beyond the initial implementation period would also improve the effectiveness of the 
program.   
Conclusion  
 
Land holds significant economic and political importance in Nepal. With land disputes 
comprising a significant proportion of cases brought to community mediation, this study has 
mapped the most common kinds of disputes plaguing communities in the Terai. It has shown 
that these primarily include disputes related to boundaries, ownership, encroachment, mohi 
and adhiya arrangements and public land. This study finds that dispute-affected populations 
understand changes in population, rising land prices and education and awareness, and the 
work of dalals as the primary drivers of land disputes. This study finds that improving 
mediator training and public awareness of land registration processes would reduce land 
disputes and support easier resolution of those currently occurring. For those involved, land 
disputes have very significant implications, with the potential to harm their livelihoods and 
render disputants landless. Given such high stakes, this study hopes to help community 
mediation programming to improve the resolution of land-related disputes and, in so doing, to 
better serve the communities in Nepal most in need of this service.  
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